



The Community-Driven Governance Network and  
Arrangements Grounded on Public-Private  
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Communities of Guangzhou

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# **The Community-Driven Governance Network and Arrangements Grounded on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Social Housing Communities of Guangzhou**

The structure of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in western countries principally focuses on reducing finance risks during the recession of affordable housing programs. As the concepts and discussions newly appeared, little attention has been paid to such frameworks in housing programs staying at a nascent stage. In the current city of Guangzhou in China, the primary matters when developing social housing are effective housing management and good community services. PPPs have formed governance network hybrids when organizing community affairs. Interview-based analysis reveals that partnerships are functioning in political arrangements spanning housing allocation and maintenance, socio-cultural development, population management, and policy-making. Involved actors comprise public sectors, private developers in the market, non/not-for-profit organizations and grassroots groups. Collaborations between various entities are directed by the local authority. And the successful operation of community-driven innovations is highly dependent on the essential chain that consists of Governmental Working Office, Property Management Company, and Owners' Committee. Notably, the key point of remaining well-organized progress hinges on mutual trust and reciprocal data sharing between sectors. The favourable outcomes in social housing communities in Guangzhou manifest that the PPPs-based governance network with a leading role of governments appears to be an appropriate way for the success of housing management.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships; governance network; collaboration; social housing communities; Guangzhou

## 1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, the affordable housing program in western countries is undergoing the challenges of recession and revitalization. In line with declined supports from the side of the state, concerning arrangements have also devolved to public and private entities at a local level (Kleit & Page, 2008). Subsequently, the collaboration between public and private experiences a fast growth to sustain the development of public housing (Kleit et al., 2019; Bortel & Gruis, 2019; Hoekstra et al., 2013; Ryser et al., 2020). The involvement of private agencies and grassroots not only redistributes burdens or risks but also creates their partnerships to drive the innovative redevelopment of public housing (Basolo & Scally, 2008; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Blessing, 2012; Haffner et al., 2015). The generation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is a new notion that gains academic acceptability in various conceptual schemes raised in the United States and European countries since the 1990s. Up to now, there is no uniform name to normalize comparable mechanisms. Researches have consensus that PPPs are characterized by community-driven actions, public-private collaboration, and non/not-for-profit organizations. The current explorations mainly identify entities, arrangements, operations, and outcomes using case studies. As to cities in China, a similar organism grounded on organizations and co-operations also guarantees the running of social housing communities foundationally. Rather than the aims of attracting investments and giving voices in western countries during the regeneration stage (Kleit & Page, 2008; Hoekstra et al., 2013), the progress in urban China stays at the early phase, and thus focuses on ensuring land provision, construction, and healthy advancement. The community-driven partnerships between public and private sectors, however, haven't been well noted and examined by now. The city of Guangzhou is a pioneer in developing social housing in China, so discussions based on this case city on what organizations are involved and what functions they

act may contribute to identifying the merits and drawbacks of this system in China, and also be suggestive for the potential improvements.

## **2. A Review of Concept PPPs**

### ***2.1 Generation of Agencies Cross-Sector in the Affordable Housing System***

As a welfare service, public housing, social housing, or programs alike are predominantly led by institutional sectors and conventionally need governmental supports because of easy access to land and funds. However, the lack of both trusts from ministries and interactions among agencies has resulted in inadequate voices of organizations at the community level, and exclusion of non/not-for-profit developers in decision-making. At the same time, the wide appearance of gentrification in urban areas and the increasing construction cost have caused diminishment and deteriorate conditions of public housing. Perversion and development of public housing nowadays, thus, has to seek new strategies in western countries (Howell et al., 2019). Instead of being partially excluded, various agencies in sectors of both public and private supported to fully involve in housing arrangements, not only offering services by own responsibilities but also engaging in political management concerning tenant and allocation (Howell, 2017; Kleit & Page, 2015; Mukhija, 2004).

Involved actors comprise be-trusted developers at the market, charities, non/not-for-profit organizations, community-based groups, and research groups. Stemming from European cases, some non/not-for-profit entities lying between the state, market, and society have been recognized their energies for revitalizing new opportunities. Instead of relying on a single sector exclusively, the actions of these agencies are fulfilled by employing comprehensive forces. And therefore, organizations are defined as hybridity in the contexts of social entrepreneurship (Czischke et al., 2012; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Bacq & Janssen, 2011). Meanwhile, in cities

of the United States, confronting disinvestment from federal subsidies and declining political management over affordable housing, the community-driven partnerships became the main force to thrive redevelopment utilizing bottom-up investment, construction and negotiation (Howell, 2016; Howell & Wilson, 2019; Howell, 2019). The progress is characterized by the heavy dependence on the operations of market dynamics and private developers. Those private sectors pursuing social values have been termed as public authorities. These entities are independent and consistently endeavour to motivate private resources into public housing using market rules (Kleit et al., 2019; Kleit & Page, 2015).

## ***2.2 Identifying the Mechanism of PPPs***

With knowing the origin and primary aims of PPPs, then criteria have been formulated to identify functions of actors, contacts between, and the operative efficiency. Since earlier models exploring actors emphasized the role of the market and capitalist (Harloe, 1995; Kemeny, 1995; 2001; Kemeny et al., 2005), they show certain limitations when examining characteristics of public housing such a welfare program (Blessing, 2012; Blessing, 2016). The recent organism grounded on cross-sector entities is at the infancy phase, and researchers attempt to develop a new conceptual framework based on comparable innovations and activities worldwide.

An accurate explanation firstly rests on answering the question ‘what the public-private partnership is.’ As this invention newly emerges, many concepts with similar connotations are coexisting with no clear-cut definitions. Since the end of the 1990s, diverse study groups have identified these organizations and arrangements as public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Ibem, 2011), social entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurship (Bacq & Janssen, 2011; Czischke et al., 2012; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010), public authorities (Blessing, 2012), the third-sector organizations, and hybridity or hybrid organization (Blessing, 2012; Brandsen et al., 2005).

Though differently termed, they try to describe organizations that exert their functions in similar ways (Bacq & Janssen, 2011). Strictly, these entities do not belong to any of the state, market, civil society or community, but lie in cross-sector positions between (Brandsen et al., 2005). Notably, they are also characterized by an explicit and primary aim of improving community or society, and all efforts and cooperation do not rest with profits (Keivani et al., 2008). By using decision-making rights, empowered voices in institutional arrangements, and profits gained from commercial activities, these organizations strive to bring funds and beneficial activities into the public housing community (Czischke et al., 2012; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Bacq & Janssen, 2011). Within the fabric, actors make use of their advantages to the maximum and endeavour to strengthen interactive contacts by data sharing and mutual supports. By now, recognized agencies encompass government-owned landlords, localized/evolved organizations of public authorities, community-driven companies or developers, and social organizations like charities and housing associations (Smith & Steven, 2010, Kleit et al., 2019; Bacq & Janssen, 2011). Because of no significant differences between these identified structures as to aims and functions, related examinations have informed on comparable results.

#### *Operation of the Public-Private Collaborations*

Various entities primarily position themselves within the governance structure to deal with concrete issues, and meanwhile jointly facilitate housing services by their collaborative connections (Czischke et al., 2012; Mullins et al., 2012). Along with a degree of decentralization of the state, community management works have been distributed differently to organizations at the community level in terms of their functions. Thus, the community-based agencies include localized ministries, private companies in limited benefits, grassroots targeting to increasing

political voices, and the non/not-for-profit or voluntary organizations aiming to offer social services (Bortel & Gruis, 2019), they together move the program forwards.

The operation of this model within the housing community is hinging on the complex interrelationships between those groups or hybrids and therefore is more like a governance structure hybrid (Mullins et al., 2012). While governmental affiliations remain dominant positions (Keivani et al., 2008; Agyemang & Morrison, 2018), a large part of detailed governance works has been taken by a mixture of these organizations (Zhou & Ronald, 2017a; Bortel & Gruis, 2019; Blessing, 2012; Ryser et al., 2020). The way of completing arrangements as to land supply, financial investment, housing construction, maintenance and improvement, is identified mainly by different agencies after negotiating and balancing benefits rather than an array of excluded decisions of authorities. Based on management results in Phoenix, Lucio & Cruz (2012) have graphed a PPPs-based network within affordable housing in terms of number, frequency, closeness and intermediary of confirmed contacts between every two actors. The facts of high centrality, high closeness, and low betweenness are evidence of the importance of an actor. The examination indicated that the private developers and non/not-for-profit organizations play central roles in multiple ways in the operative structure.

Governmental affiliations such as the local authorities mainly give their supports to various organizations from the aspect of legislation (Kleit & Page, 2008; Kleit et al., 2019). Developing this structure indeed underpins their roles and increases contacts. Such partnerships tend to be more efficient and innovative at finance and localized governance. The governmental mandates ensure the land provision, private developers facilitate various finances for qualified housing construction and management, and grassroots engage in activities that contribute to modifying the running of a community-based network (Bortel & Gruis, 2019; Ibem, 2011).

### *Effects and Results*

The governance running under PPPs earns benefits from both sides of public and private, then appears to be more competent in housing delivery. Intensive participation and cooperation of various groups can maximize their effects and reduce shortcomings (e.g. financial risks, and low efficiency) caused by the monopoly of the state (Ibem, 2011). The co-operative arrangements, in turn, mobilize the flow of information and consequently enhance partnerships between actors (Agranoff, 1991; Agranoff & McGuire 2001; Provan & Milward 2001; Meier & O'Toole, 2001, 2003; O'Toole, 1997). PPPs mainly make effects along the line of bottom-up (Silverman, 2008; Rubin, 2000; Swanstrom, 1999; Howell, 2016). Stakeholders involved in PPPs are able to report back and adjust new policies when dealing with matters at the community level (Howell, 2017; Ryser et al., 2020; Pestoff, 2014; Osborne, 2010; Clark et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2017; Blessing, 2012). Studies have manifested that these efforts present specific motivations for attracting financial resources and reducing financial risks. Particularly, the involvement of major or minor finance agencies enriches the diversification and flexibility of housing funds (Basolo & Scally, 2008; Scally, 2009). And definite effects further expand to tenant empowerment, community governance, and infrastructure construction (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Bacq & Janssen, 2011; Bortel & Gruis, 2019; Ryser et al., 2020).

Despite these positive significances, this mechanism also confronts several barriers caused by lacking trust and limited information exchange between actors in distinct sectors (Howell et al., 2019). As the good operation of the structure primarily relies on reliable interactions (Stoecker, 2003; Howell, 2017), these drawbacks are supposed to decline institutional powers or voices of entities, and thus prevent an effective operation. Endeavours of increasing operative efficiencies



of PPPs-based governance network should focus on trust-building, facilitating planning, and sharing knowledge (Howell, 2017).

### ***2.3 Significance of the Case Study of Guangzhou***

The merits of PPPs, such as supporting reasonable progress of decision-making and healthy running of communities, have been realized and confirmed by western academics. Through institutional rights, market forces and social contacts, the stakeholders make efforts on reasonable strategies against the declined value of affordable housing. The current discussions highly concentrate on explaining its formation and seeking potential improvements.

the main issue hinges on perfecting allocation and housing services. This scheme is predominantly conducted by the governmental affiliations at the nation level and the city level (Zhang, 1997, Yu, 2006; Zhu et al., 2014; Caulfield, 2006). Coming to governance at the community level, various organizations gain chances to handle housing affairs fully. The purposes of this governance network grounded on PPPs in urban China are different from those in Europe and the US. On the one hand, governmental sectors, private developers, spontaneous grassroots, and other sectors in non/not-for-profit, attempt to assist concrete works of construction and regulation. On the other hand, they are also able to participant in political arrangements to some degree to affect decisions concerning the living environment. Therefore, examining the structure and the operation of PPPs in urban China may have multifaceted benefits: to add specific information of community-driven governance network hasn't been well recognized, and to provide experiences for some developing housing programs in Asia or Africa when exploring experiences.

In China, the city of Guangzhou is a pioneer in developing social housing programs. Thus, we look into features of PPPs functioning in the governance within Guangzhou's social housing

system. The analysis will address the questions: ‘which organizations have been incorporated in the collaborative structure’? ‘Whether involved actors can take their positions and cooperate successfully’? And ‘how efficient does this PPPs-based governance network work as to the outcome of housing provision’? The study starts with a brief introduction of the concept, and then successively identifies involved agencies, roles, interactions and potential effects on governmental decisions, market deals and community arrangements.

### **3. Method and Data**

Based on literature research on strategies of PPPs, the empirical study employs the method of key informant interviews to investigate actors and their actions within the organism of governance. To reveal how agencies are involved and function, the study has utilized in-depth interviews with structured and open-ended questions to investigate the working way of agencies at the level of city and community. Firstly, we respectively organized official conversations with eleven official staff in the Guangzhou Bureau of Land Resource and Housing (GBLRH) during 2013-2014. Interviewees comprise five policymakers and six administrators whose works spanning land provision, fundraising, and housing management. The contents focused on the aims of developing partnerships, strategies and supports arranged, and evaluations on outcomes. In addition, we also assembled materials of policies, plans, and reports that were documented by GBLRH.

Secondly, the community-level interviews were implemented within four social housing communities (i.e. Jude, Tangde, Fanghe, and Jinshazhou) in Guangzhou (see [Figure. 1](#)). Ten community-based managers engaged in local organizations, such as Governmental Working Office (GWO), Property Management Company (PMC), owners’ committee, and service centre, have joined our investigations. The key themes include their responsibilities, interactions formed

and assessments on the current operation that is a success or failure. Additionally, in-depth interviews with another twenty-two residents in social housing communities were targeted to know personal perceptions of the community governance network in their daily lives. During field trips, all interviews were manually recorded, and the approach of visual ethnography played a supplementary role in collecting instant information by way of occasional note-taking and photography.

#### **4. Social Housing Communities and Governance**

The housing provision is not only an economic outcome but also concerns the stability and balance of a society. After experiencing two reforms, the abolishment of the housing market during 1949-1978 (Wang & Murie, 2011; Deng et al. 2014; Wang, 1995) and the boom of the housing market since 1979 (Chen & Gao, 1993; Chen, 1996; Chiu, 1996; Wu, 1996; Zhou & Logan, 1996; Wang, 2000), the market-dominant housing provision had been formulated finally. This model has achieved great success in improving housing conditions, facilities, and ownerships (Ronald & Doling, 2014). However, the importance of profits carried by urban land and the rapid development of the real estate market has triggered dramatic growth of housing price in urban areas. Comparing to 1998, housing price in the market has increased nearly three times by 2014 (NBSC, 1999-2015). And most residents tend to choose housings in terms of their economic affordability (Zhang, 1997; Yu, 2006; Huang & Jiang, 2009; Liu & Mao, 2012; Wang & Li, 2006). However, the mismatch of housing price and affordability subsequently demonstrates a severe shortage of affordable housing of the groups that are economically weak or institutionally excluded by the local system (Wang et al., 2020; Wang & Murie, 2011; Shi et al., 2016). These groups show features of low-rate household ownership, comparable inferior housing quality and facilities, and smaller per capita living space. Facing problems of the acute

unaffordability at the crossroad (Chen et al., 2010; Man, 2011; Zhou & Ronald, 2017a) and the housing stratification at socio-spatial (Yi & Huang, 2014), construction of social housing has turned into a critical social mission for ensuring essential housing access and sustaining housing equity (Shi et al., 2016; Fitzpatrick & Watts, 2017; Arundel & Hochstenbach, 2020).

Since the 1990s, the state of China mandates governmental affiliations to subsidize middle- and low-income residents by offering social housing in various types (e.g. low-rent housing, economically affordable housing, price-capped housing, and public-rental housing) (Zhu, 2014; Wang & Murie, 2000; Rosen & Ross, 2000; Huang & Clark, 2002; Zhang, 2006; Lee & Zhu, 2006). This welfare project with limited profits is implemented commonly at the city level with predominant governance of the local authorities, who have shouldered on account of free land provision, not-for-profit fiscal investment, and complicated management. Therefore, the recent studies concerning agencies in social housing rarely moved attention away from the role of governmental sectors (Chen et al., 2014) and the market (Fu & Lin, 2013). Concerns on the other actors like private developers, non/not-for-profit entities, and grassroots remain lack, and their localized initiatives and interactions appear to be overlooked. However, the development of social housing communities nowadays strongly leans on collaborative actions of agencies from different sectors. It is meaningful to examine them from the perspective of PPPs. With the leading role of local government, other actors are empowered with accordingly rights and positions within the network directing to community services (Ding, 2003; Cheng et al., 2006; Zhang, 1997, Yu, 2006; Yeung & Howes, 2006; Zhu et al., 2014; Caulfield, 2006). Zhou & Ronald (2017b) have pointed out the existence of such a mechanism made of local authorities and market actors in social housing in city Chongqing.

#### ***4.1 Social Housing Program in Guangzhou***

The policy ‘A Notification by the State Council on Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and Accelerating Housing Construction’ officially pushed the social housing scheme forward in Guangzhou in 1998. Two main types, low-rent housing (LRH) and economically affordable housing (EAH) have been established as a safety net for local households with low incomes (Lee & Zhu, 2006; Zhu et al., 2014). LRH addresses housing difficulties of the lowest- and low-income families through in-kind housing subsidy, and EAH targets the lower-middle-income families by selling dwellings constructed under regulations on size and price. At the start of a new turn of construction since 2004, Guangzhou has been set as the pilot city to develop a multi-level provision structure with the additional provision of another two types, price-capped housing (PCH) for middle-income households and public rental housing (PRH) for incorporate unhoused young workers and migrants with stable jobs (Chen et al., 2014; Hansson & Lundgren, 2019; Yeung & Howes, 2006). Both great political supports and huge investment contribute to the increasing number of social housing within city areas. By 2014, in total thirteen communities had come into service, and another fifty were under construction. The 80670 units of social housing have been completed to guarantee housing needs (GBLRH, 2013). Over 95% of housing is located in fringe areas of the northern and the eastern city, and 2% and 1% lie in central districts, respectively.

#### ***4.2 Structure of the Community-Driven Governance Network***

The social housing provision in Guangzhou is dominated by the local government (Chen et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2020; Wu, 1996). The institutional mandates carry out along the line of hierarchical structure top-down. Governmental affiliations at each administrative level have built up their collaborations with agencies in different sectors (e.g. public sector, private sector and the

third sector). GBLRH has offered opportunities to the following agencies to join the governance at the city level. The structure encompasses the local authorities of Guangzhou Bureau of Urban Planning (GBUP), Guangzhou Bureau of Civil Affairs (GBCA), and the private developers of construction companies, finance corporations, PMC, and the non/not-for-profit organizations like the community service centre, owners' committee, research groups and so on (see Table. 1). At the same time, GBLRH specially establishes a Social Housing Office (SHO) to fully handle matters of housing provision. The organ of SHO consists of ten subordinate departments ensuring the operation. Four sectors (i.e. personnel department, financial management department, general department, and contract administration department) are dealing with plans- and strategies-making, funds rising, documentary compiling, and personal arrangement these supporting works. The other six sectors (i.e. land collection and reservation department, project preparation department, project management department, housing management department, service centre, and coordination department) take charge of executions regarding the land provision, housing construction, housing allocation, and community management (Zhu et al., 2014; Caulfield, 2006; Zhang, 1997, Yu, 2006). These organizations have formed partnerships to increase the information exchange and share, and then improve their works and efficiency of the entire system (Cai & Wu, 2019).

The way of actors' engagement links to the concentrations of the current phase. At the preparing stage, the focus is to raise funds from both government revenue and private investments in aims of social values. The financings of companies or individuals in the market are not in profits. Based on data of the urban lands offered by GBUP, SHO decides the land parcels for social housing use for free (Shi et al., 2016). Then opportunities for land development are opened to housing developers in the real estate market. In line with the requirements with cost, profits and

housing conditions, construction companies make designs on the community layout, housing blocks and supporting infrastructures (Ding, 2003; Cheng et al., 2006). Qualifying proposals from candidates are checked in the public bidding hold by the government, and the chosen one will be the eventual partner gaining the disposal right of land and the chance of housing construction. The construction process is completed under collaborative interactions between sectors. Private developers provide technics and materials with limited benefits, public sector of SHO supervises the schedule and offers political supports. In the next stage of housing allocation, institutional arrangements hold by the service centre of SHO. Concrete jobs entail setting entrance qualifications, structuring the application process, approval examining and verifying, withdrawal and eviction. The partnership with GBCA provides fundamental information of residents and applicants (e.g. household assets, incomes, and housing conditions), on which the entry threshold is based. And then execution of the application, check, supervision, allotment and re-allotment, rely on collaborations between the service centre, GBCA, and the community-level groups and individuals.

The primary management within communities is fulfilled within a hybrid network. More entities have engaged, such as GWO, PMCs, the neighbourhood committee, spontaneous owners' committee, non/not-for-profit organizations targeting social services, single residents, research groups or experts, and the mass media (see Table. 1). Among them, GWO and PMC play as the key actors in organizing related services. Meanwhile, bottom-up initiatives facilitate the formation of a feedback mechanism, which deepens the degree of individual participation, and strengthens institutional voices as well. By way of the public election, the owners' committee takes responsibility for exchanging information with all sectors on behalf of the residents. In

addition, agencies like the research groups and the mass media concentrate on the merits and drawbacks, problems, and solutions directing to a healthy community.

### ***4.3 Housing Arrangements of PPPs***

In this community-driven governance system, involved organizations (see Table. 1) promote housing provision and housing management by giving possible supports, and participants in the process of decision-making and implementation. In this sense, the facts of this network are more like governance structure hybrids and service hybrids, rather than the financial dependencies hybrids in western countries. Principally, the well-functioning of institutional arrangements hangs on several interdependent partnerships and effective communications. The following statement will elaborate on what kind of partnerships has been created and how they cooperate in modifying the governance outcomes.

#### *PPPs-based Housing Administrative Governance*

When institutional arrangements localize to the community level, administrative works primarily execute within the circle constituted by three essential agencies: GWO, PMC, and residents (see Figure. 2). Their collaborative actions concentrate on residential qualification spanning application, permission, subsidy, regulation, prolongation, and withdrawal. Within every community, SHO establishes a subordinate working office GWO with several officers and employs a PMC in the meantime. Two organizations constitute the core actors of the administrative centre. The community of Fanghe, for instance, has a room lying in a central building for office use of the two agencies. The spatial proximity of working places not only provides convenience for the easy process but also improves social intimacy for better data sharing and communications. According to plans and rules of the local authority, GWO structures an implement draft, and then amends specific content and measures with PMC in keeping with



the local circumstance, and finally put into effect jointly. The public sector takes charge of conceiving rules and defining executing procedures, while the private company mainly offers suggestions for execution, labour supply, and material supports. As to any problems in processing, residents can feedback or report back to both agencies. This governance mechanism highly relies on effective cooperation, which ensures the success of implementation and is also beneficial for improving community identification of residents.

One typical administration is the credit points-based regulation carried out in 2012, and the trial version started in communities Fanghe and Jinshazhou. The policy has announced several rules, and behaviours of residents directly link to the point numbers of their households. As to any violations or behaviours out of line, the administrator will deduct corresponding points as a punishment. Similarly, adding points is the reward for contributions. The amount of points eventually determines the qualification in accessing in-kind subsidies. Meanwhile, every resident in the community can supervise the fairness of the process. When total points of a household drop below the entry line, the government will withdraw the housing occupancy qualification. These facts indicate how agencies and individuals are involved in arrangements, and we also notice that the administrative governance fundamentally builds on the partnerships between GWO and PMC.

#### *PPPs-based Community Services*

Community services mainly deal with physical construction, social integration, cultural activities, and demographic management. Same as agencies within the administrative framework, PMC, GWO and residents act as three main actors during the physical construction of infrastructures, housing maintenance, and property security. The chief executor is PMC, who nearly takes full responsibility for housing repair and conservation, neighbourhood security and sanitary.

Organizing these services follows the market rules, and residents pay fees to services provided by PMC. The difference is that GWO plays as the employer. Its intervention demonstrates at opting one PMC for residents in the market by verifying the service quality and price. Residents reflect problems to PMC, they can also report suggestions and evaluations about PMC's works back to GWO. To secure peoples' benefits, GWO coordinates in between and holds the right to change the company on behalf of residents as well.

As to the governance structure for population management, involved entities are the neighbourhood committee, GWO, and PMC (see Figure. 2). Three agencies establish mutual connections to offer household- or individual-oriented assistance. The neighbourhood committee is the basic government sector working on demography. The committee engages in policy delivery, residential assistance, and subsidy allocation to people living in the administrative area. Based on detailed demographic data (e.g. age, location, income level, assets) neighbourhood committee, GWO and PMC conjointly provide local-based job opportunities (e.g. newsstand, cleaning, housekeeping, security) in proximity and some career training (e.g. handcraft, maintenance) to needed residents. Their partnerships functioning during the negotiation, information exchange, and demographic management, not only resolve the economic difficulties of specific residents effectively but also produce positive effects on balancing equity, improving identification of belongings, and neighbourhood integration.

Finally, actors engaged in organizing social and cultural activities incorporate the community service centre, grassroots organizations (e.g. volunteer groups, spontaneous associations for cultural activities), GWO, neighbourhood committee, and PMC. The service centre is a not-for-profit sector directing to easy, integrated and delighted living experiences in the community. Origin of funds includes governmental subsidies, social donations from charities, companies, and

individuals. And the human resource contains official staff, trainers, assistants, and many volunteers. The service centre supplies gratis help regarding news publicity, childmind after school, facilitating residents' communication and leisure, and giving aids for medicines and sanitary. Besides, the service centre also offers small-cost services like employment assistance and skills training. These job opportunities are assembled by agencies of the neighbourhood committee, PMC, companies in the market, and individuals. Nevertheless, grassroots organizations for cultural activities are formed because of voluntary and initiative intentions and are arranged in non/not-for-profit. The existence of such groups greatly enriches social and cultural life within communities, so GWO and PMC give great supports for these activities. For example, the working space of the service centre is provided in no refund and maintained for free, and the activities hold by grassroots have obtained official permissions. Obviously, these collaborating behaviours ensure the healthy operation of socio-cultural activities.

Along with contributions from entities at their positions and successful collaboration, PPPs-based innovations of the service network have been reinforced to a large extent. The strong interdependency in tandem makes for high efficiency and eventually gains favourable circumstances for living and belongings.

#### *PPPs-based Political Participation*

Besides governmental agencies, a private agency of PMC and grassroots owners' committee also join the political arrangements of decision-making. The rising of the owners' committee is a result of spontaneous intention that making voices of grassroots to be truly heard, further brings positive effects to the community. The committee makes effects bottom-up and not for profits. Through the democratic election, residents select 3-4 members as the representatives of the committee. On the side of residents, they try to express primary opinions to the local authorities

to influence policy results. They also take charge of the negotiation with other agencies (see [Figure. 2](#)).

Consequently, to improve the equity of political procedures and the stability of development, SHO empowers the owners' committee and PMC with institutional rights. Opening opportunities make members of two organizations able to join the policy-making process, during which express opinions or suggestions from their perspectives. Together with GWO, they mainly strive to nominate local-based rules that may be most suitable for housing allocation, infrastructure construction, and interactions within the community-driven governance network. Managers in communities have consistently responded that developing the innovative model based on PPPs has been manifested its benefits as to operational efficiency and community advancement.

#### *PPPs-based Reciprocal Interaction*

Nevertheless, the PPPs-based fabric is essentially dependent on mutual trust and easy communications between actors. Active interdependency, in turn, enhances well-organized operation and outcomes. As indicated, structuring plans, strategies, and arrangements on housing administration or community services, substantially rely on effective information exchanges, unblocked conversations, and reciprocal supports among stakeholders involved. Managers of communities have consistently identified that strengthening interactions with other organizations is the most effective way to achieve ideal results. Experiences reveal that to make innovations successful, lots of efforts ought to pay on removing barriers during information flow. In addition, sharing information also rests with the involvement of the mass media and research groups. Typical participation took place in 2007, where an attempt adjusted draft clauses of 'The Implement of Economically Affordable Housing'. Governmental affiliations opened a window to collect suggestions and feedback from the public and experts. They endeavour to examine merits

and flaws, consequences and risks to be noticed by the public, and simultaneously impetus the running of this welfare project.

## **5. Findings and Conclusion**

This study has narrated that PPPs are the foundation of a community-driven governance network in the social housing of Guangzhou. The current issues concentrate on improving management outcomes. And communities have formed a governance structure whose main body is composed of GWO, PWC, and owners' committee. GWO places at the leading position and cooperates with another two agencies. Interactions among three actors establish the executive chain for decision-making, policy execution, and information delivery in the progress of housing administration and community services. Apart from their contributions, the well-functioning of governance also relies on the engagement of non/not-for-profit organizations, grassroots, and other sectors. The neighbourhood committee, community service centre, associations for volunteers and leisure, the mass media, and research groups maintain their reciprocal interactions as to matters of population management and community advancement.

To conclude, PPPs-based innovations in social housing communities tend to be the governance structure hybrids and the service hybrids. The governance network addresses effectual housing management and dynamic community progression. Realizing the importance of the partnerships, the governmental sectors greatly encourage community-driven collaborations from aspects of mobilizing data sharing, advocating communications, and reciprocal supports among diverse stakeholders. This mechanism is running successfully in the city of Guangzhou. Positive attitudes and assessments from interviewed managers indicate that PPPs are well-organized and able to energise collaborations significantly. Therefore, the governance network grounded on PPPs with government-leading suggests a suitable structure to improve the social housing scheme organized

at the infant period. This governance functions more like a balancing act, so mutual trusts and high-quality interactions eventually determine success. The key to this mechanism hinges on organic collaborations and the energetic information exchange. Strengthening these reciprocal supports not only contributes to the policy implementation but also drives a positive circulation.

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